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Abstract
Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely 
real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and 
those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue 
against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our 
own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguat-
ing two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong—
and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then introduce a 
Waltonian variety of fictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort 
of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits 
with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better ac-
count of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences.
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In Longbow, a virtual reality application for the HTC Vive, you defend 
your castle from an advancing horde of cartoonish grey raiders by, 
as the title suggests, filling them full of arrows. It features several 
apparent objects—the castle walls you stand upon, the longbow in 
your hands, the arrows you fire, and, of course, the comical grey 
army. Further, playing Longbow involves the apparent occurrence of 
several events: for example, your scanning the valley before your 
castle wall, your drawing the bowstring, and, eventually, the de-
struction of your doomed castle gate. But what is the ontological sta-
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tus of these objects and these events—are they, in some sense, real?1
Virtual realists say that virtual objects (e.g. my virtual longbow) re-
ally exist, and virtual events (e.g. my shooting a grey cartoon raider 
with an arrow) really take place. Meanwhile, virtual irrealists hold 
that virtual objects do not really exist, and that virtual events do not 
really occur.
The virtual ir/realist debate concerns an intrinsically interesting 
ontological question, which also impacts surrounding debates about 
virtual reality. For example, since at least Nozick (1974), there has 
been debate about whether experiences undergone within a virtual 
environment are somehow not as valuable as real-life experience. 
Virtual irrealists have an ontological justification for this intuition; 
similarly, realists can naturally say that virtual experiences are (or 
at least can be) just as valuable are real ones.2 Relatedly, there are 
questions about whether perceptual experiences within virtual real-
ity are non-illusory. Here, realism pairs well with the idea that our 
perceptions of them are veridical, and irrealism with the claim that 
such perceptual experiences are (something like) illusions. Finally, 
one area of rising interest concerns the (virtual) theft of virtual ob-
jects.3 On its face, these require adopting virtual realism; after all, 
you can’t steal something that doesn’t exist. However, virtual irreal-
ists may be able to do some fancy footwork to explicate what is going 
on in such cases. For these reasons, those interested in virtual reality 
should pay some attention to this broadly ontological debate.
Recently, Chalmers (2017) has developed a particular version of 
1 Following Chalmers, we set this debate as one concerning the “reality” 
of virtual objects/events. But what does ‘real’ here mean? We, like Dummett 
(1963: 146), Putnam (1981: 49), Wright (1986: 5), Bennett (2009: 41), and Jen-
kins (2010), take being an F-realist to amount to (or, at minimum, involve) claim-
ing that the way that the Fs are is mind-independent—i.e., independent of the way 
we think, talk, experience, or conceptualize, about the Fs. C.f. Chalmers 2009: 
92 for an alternative conception, and Joyce 2009 for criticism of Chalmers.
2 Obviously, this massively simplifies the issue here since one can, for exam-
ple, be an irrealist and hold that virtual experiences are as valuable as real ones, or 
be a realist and claim virtual experiences are less valuable than non-virtual ones. 
For further discussion, see Cogburn and Silcox 2014 and Wildman (ms).
3 For some recent discussion see e.g. Lodder 2013, Wall 2009, and Noveck 
and Balkin 2006.
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realism, virtual digitalism. Here, we aim to do two things. First, we 
will critique Chalmers’ virtual digitalism—and, as our objections 
readily generalize to cover alternative versions, realism in general. 
Second, building off our critique, we go on to develop a broadly 
Waltonian version of virtual irrealism, virtual walt-fictionalism. This, 
we suggest, is a natural account of virtual objects.
More concretely, we begin (§1) by clarifying two forms of virtual 
digitalism—a strong version that identifies virtual and digital objects 
and a weaker version that rejects identification, though still plumps 
for a kind of dependence relation. We go on (§§2–3) to challenge 
these, before briefly dismissing (§4) a potential wrinkle. We then 
sketch (§5) an irrealist alternative, finally concluding (§6) by briefly 
considering future avenues for developing this alternative picture.
1 Two virtual digitalisms
In its simplest form, virtual digitalism is the conjunction of:
(1) Virtual objects are digital objects
(2) Events in virtual worlds (largely) are digital events4
As a simplifying assumption we, following Chalmers, take digital 
objects to be data structures (2017: 317), which are themselves 
grounded in computational processes (that are in turn grounded in 
physical processes); we return to this assumption in (§4).
There are several, conflicting ways to be a virtual digitalist, de-
pending upon how one understands the ‘are’ in (1) and (2). If one 
treats the ‘are’ as expressing identity, the resulting position, strong 
virtual digitalism, then centres around a pair of identity theses:
(S1) Virtual objects are identical to (really existing) digital objects
(S2) Events in virtual worlds are identical to (really occurring) 
digital events
4 We, following Chalmers, include the “largely” qualification in order to al-
low for events that are physical (e.g., users moving controllers around). We take 
a similar restriction applies in the case of (S2) and (W2) but, for readability, have 
left it suppressed.
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In contrast, one can read the ‘are’ not as identity, but rather as some-
thing like dependence. The resulting weak virtual digitalism holds 
that virtual objects/events are not identical to digital objects/events, 
though the former are in some sense dependent upon the latter. 
Thus, it is committed to:
(W1) Virtual objects are dependent upon distinct, really existing 
digital objects
(W2) Events in virtual worlds are dependent upon distinct, really 
occurring digital events
Different variants of weak virtual digitalism replace ‘dependence’ 
with alternative relations (e.g. grounding, supervenience, etc.), 
though the core idea remains the same: virtual objects are distinct 
entities whose (real!) existence is derived from the existence of more 
fundamental digital objects.
One can adopt various combinations of these principles; for exam-
ple, it is coherent to accept an identity theory for virtual objects, but 
dependence theory for virtual events (i.e., to hold S1 and W2). Ex-
actly how coherent these combinations are is an interesting question. 
However, the objections we will raise in the following can be readily 
applied to any combination of the above principles. So, for ease of pre-
sentation, we will focus on the “natural” packages described above.
It is not clear whether Chalmers himself prefers strong or weak 
digitalism, as he says things that appear to support both views. For 
example, he initially suggests that we can regard virtual objects ‘as 
data structures’. This characterisation, given as a tentative ‘first ap-
proximation’ (2017: 317), is suggestive of a strong form of virtu-
al digitalism. Further, the arguments he gives to motivate virtual 
digitalism—discussed below in §2.1—only make sense assuming 
strong digitalism. However, Chalmers also says that a virtual ob-
ject is ‘a higher-level entity constituted by … data structures’ (2017: 
317), which suggests weak digitalism. Additionally, in earlier work, 
Chalmers explicitly rejected identifying virtual and digital objects:
… we should reject claims of token identity between microscopic and 
macroscopic levels. Tables are not identical to any object characterized 
purely in terms of quantum-mechanics; likewise, virtual tables are not 
identical to any objects characterized purely in terms of bits. But never-
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theless, facts about tables supervene on quantum-mechanical facts, and 
facts about virtual tables supervene on computational facts. So it seems 
reasonable to say that tables are constituted by quantum processes, and 
that virtual tables are constituted by computational processes. (MaM)
Regardless, it is clear that both strong and weak variants are avail-
able to would-be digitalists. Consequently, a thorough discussion of 
virtual digitalism must take both into account. And, more gener-
ally, any form of virtual realism that does not take virtual objects/
events to be sui generis entities but instead treats them as intimately 
bound up with some other class of entity (either via identity or via 
dependence) will also divide in this way. Thus, properly assessing the 
viability of virtual realism more broadly requires giving both strong 
and weak virtual digitalism serious consideration.
The proceeding two sections focus on them in turn. In “The 
Virtual and the Real” Chalmers first raised arguments against a fic-
tionalist view of the virtual, then proceeded to defend his digitalist 
position. Here, we reverse this order: we first consider arguments 
against virtual digitalism (in both strong and weak forms), then pro-
pose a fictionalist position that can stand up to Chalmers’ critique.
2 Against strong virtual digitalism
As detailed in the previous section, strong virtual digitalism (SVD 
for short) takes virtual objects to be identical to digital objects, and 
virtual events to be (largely) identical to digital events. Such a posi-
tion is both prima facie appealing and fits well with many of things 
that Chalmers says in favour of virtual digitalism.
In this section, we sketch two problems for SVD. The first is 
broadly motivational: the arguments that Chalmers has offered for 
SVD fail. Consequently, there is—if you’ll pardon the pun—no 
strong reason to accept SVD. Meanwhile, the second concerns the 
possibility of cross-platform play.
2.1 Motivation problems
Chalmers (2017) offers two arguments for virtual digitalism. The 
argument from causal powers states:
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(C1) Virtual objects have certain causal powers (to affect other 
virtual objects, to affect users, and so on.)
(C2) Digital objects really have those causal powers (and nothing 
else does)
(C3) Therefore, virtual objects are digital objects.5
This argument only makes sense if we read the ‘are’ in (C3) as an 
expression of identity; if it were something weaker, then (C1) and 
(C2) would be contradictory (how could only digital objects have the 
relevant causal powers if non-identical virtual objects also have such 
powers?).
Regardless, the argument is problematic. Proper virtual reality 
is interactive, in the sense that user actions can make significant dif-
ferences to the virtual environment.6 Such interactivity requires that 
users have causal powers to affect virtual objects—otherwise, they 
wouldn’t be able to interact. Yet users are not digital objects.7 Con-
sequently, (C2) ought to be rejected.
In reply, the SVDist could claim that the argument wasn’t intend-
ed to capture general causal powers; rather, it was meant to involve 
certain specific causal powers (e.g. the power to affect these spe-
cific virtual objects in such-and-such a manner). By definition, these 
powers are not available to users, so the objection to (2) is blocked.
However, this is not a satisfying response. First, restricting the 
argument to specific powers in this way also restricts the overall 
upshot—at best, the argument can now tell us that a particular vir-
tual object v is identical to a particular digital object d in virtue of 
the fact that only d possesses the specific power F that v is thought to 
have. This radically restricts the scope of SVD; it now only extends 
to those virtual objects for which we can specify such hyper-specific 
5 Chalmers 2017: 318.
6 Chalmers 2017: 312.
7 Objection: What if we’re all in the Matrix? Then users are digital objects! 
Reply: In that case, users are a radically different kind of digital object than the 
sort relevant here. For lack of better terms, users would be Matrix-external digital 
objects, in contrast to our Matrix-internal digital avatars which engage with Matrix-
internal digital objects.
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powers. Second, it is unclear what specific powers we might invoke 
that would allow us to successfully run the argument. This is pri-
marily because doing so requires that we naturally ascribe the same 
power to both the virtual and the digital object.8 However, in purely 
virtual terms, we might say that virtual object v has the power to 
make virtual ball b virtually blue, while we might also say that digi-
tal object d has the power to make digital object d2 have property G. 
The trouble is that there is no obvious reason to say that these are 
the same powers, rather than different ones—in fact, assuming so 
without external motivation begs the question, since it assumes that 
a specific digital outcome is identical to a specific virtual outcome.
The second argument for strong virtual digitalism is the argument 
from perception:
(P1) When using virtual reality, we perceive (only) virtual objects.
(P2) The objects we perceive are the causal basis of our percep-
tual experiences.
(P3) When using virtual reality, the causal basis of our percep-
tual experiences are digital objects.
(P5) Therefore, virtual objects are digital objects.9
Note that, as with the previous, this argument is only plausible if 
the ‘are’ in (P4) expresses identity; if it were a weaker relation, then 
(P2) and (P3) would entail the falsity of (P1).
However, this argument also fails. First, the argument is only 
valid if we understand (P3) as an exhaustive claim:
(P3*) When using virtual reality, the causal basis of all our per-
ceptual experiences are only digital objects.
Without ‘all’ and ‘only’ we leave open the possibility that some of 
our VR perceptual experiences do not have just digital objects as 
their causal basis; consequently, the virtual objects involved in these 
8 This second objection would seem to apply even if there is no restriction 
to specific causal powers. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
9 Chalmers 2017: 318.
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experiences are either identical to some non-digital objects or are sui 
generis entities. So, (P4) only follows if we read the argument with 
(3*) instead of (3).
Problem: (P3*) is false. Consider a multi-user VR environment. 
Within this environment, the causal basis for at least some of our 
perceptual experiences will be other users. Consequently, it is not 
the case that our VR perceptual experiences have only digital objects 
as their causal basis.
Thus there is a kind of dilemma: either the argument features 
(P3) and is invalid, or features (P3*) and includes a false premise. 
Either way, the argument fails.
SVDists might reply by arguing that multi-user VR environments 
are radically different than single-user environments. Two replies. 
First, this looks utterly ad hoc. Put bluntly, the fundamental onto-
logical nature of virtual objects shouldn’t depend upon how many 
users are engaged with them. But second, single-user environments 
work just as well. Consider the case where you look at your virtual 
self (e.g. your avatar) moving around. Given (P2), in so doing, you 
see yourself. However, you are not a digital object. Consequently, 
(P3*) is false.10
When we combined the failure of this argument with that of the 
previous, we can see that SVD has a motivation problem: what has 
been said in favour of it looks problematic, leaving it unclear why we 
should adopt the position. This suffices to call into question the vi-
ability of SVD.
Of course, it’s one thing to attack the positive arguments in fa-
vour of a position and quite another to raise objections to it. With 
that in mind, the next sub-section offers a problem that seems to 
undermine strong virtual digitalism entirely.
10 Chalmers might attempt to respond to this point by restricting (P2) to 
proximal, rather than distal causes. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for sug-
gesting this reply.) However, so restricted, (P2) looks implausible. For consider 
a case where Nathan and Neil are using Skype to video chat. It is plausible to say 
that when Nathan looks at the image on his screen, he perceives Neil (though 
Nathan is in Tilburg and Neil in Glasgow). Yet this is incompatible with the re-
stricted version of (P2). Further, this restriction is incompatible with Chalmers’ 
interpretation of mirror cases (2017: 328–9), since it entails that we don’t per-
ceive other cars when we look in our rear-view mirrors.
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2.2 The cross-play problem
Cross-play occurs whenever users on multiple, distinct systems in-
teract within a single virtual environment. Though few apps sup-
porting cross-play are available for VR so far, they do exist (as in the 
case of AltspaceVR and Spaces from Facebook), and can be expected to 
expand as VR becomes a social platform. Further, cross-play has oc-
curred in non-VR cases: for example, Epic Games’ Fortnite (briefly) 
allowed players on Xbox and PlayStation consoles to play together 
(once it was discovered, it was quickly quashed by Sony executives), 
and Rocket League is poised to support wide-spread cross-play be-
tween Xbox, PlayStation, Nintendo Switch, and PC users.11
The possibility of cross-play cases raises a significant problem for 
SVD. Suppose that Frisbee is a cross-play-supporting VR application 
of a virtual environment wherein multiple users can play virtually 
throw around a virtual frisbee. Suppose further that Neil, on his 
HTC Vive in 32-bit mode, and Nathan, using his Oculus Rift (which 
only supports 64-bit mode), are playing Frisbee together over a peer-
to-peer network (i.e. there is no mediating server that controls the 
game). In such a case, there is a single virtual object that Neil and Na-
than are both engaged with—the virtual frisbee. However, as the lo-
cal hardware and system architecture of their respective VR set-ups 
are radically different and, since there is no common server, there is 
no single digital object that both Neil and Nathan are engaged with. 
Consequently, there is no digital object that the virtual frisbee is 
identical to. In other words, strong virtual digitalism is false.12
More generally, the possibility of VR cross-play entails the pos-
sibility of users co-engaging with a single virtual object despite there 
being no single digital object they are co-engaged with. Consequently, 
it is possible that these virtual objects are not identical to the relevant 
digital objects. Given the necessity of distinctness, it follows that the 
former are not identical to the latter, which entails the falsity of SVD.
11 http://www.ign.com/articles/2016/07/20/rocket-league-ps4-xbox-one-
cross-network-play-now-ready-for-release-only-needs-sonys-approval
12 In effect, this cross-play problem for strong virtual digitalism parallels mul-
tiple-realizability objections to mind-brain identity, so the objections and replies 
in that debate will, mutatis mutandis, arise here.
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We anticipate two potential responses. The first is to claim that 
cross-play is far from typical, and so not an appropriate test case 
for theorizing. However, whilst VR cross-play is not typical today, 
the explicit ambition of Facebook (the owners of Oculus) is to make 
it a new social arena, with widespread uptake across multiple plat-
forms.13 So cross-play will not be atypical for long.
The second response is that what is happening in a cross-play case 
is actually two distinct, albeit corresponding experiences, involving 
two digital and two virtual objects. By analogy, consider chess by 
mail; here, each player acts out the moves on their own board, sepa-
rately communicating their moves to their opponent. Here you have 
two black kings, two white queens, and, one might say, two games 
of chess—games that match each other in the competitive details, 
but two nonetheless.
In a similar vein, according to this response, cross-play involves 
two distinct, but corresponding, virtual worlds, populated by dis-
tinct, corresponding virtual objects—Neil’s frisbee and Nathan’s 
frisbee—which are identical to distinct digital objects: the digital 
object on Neil’s rig and the digital object on Nathan’s set-up. Du-
plicating virtual objects in the manner would dodge the objection: 
there is not a single virtual object that Neil and Nathan are both 
interacting with, so there is no problem.
But such rampant duplication is a repugnant result. Sticking with 
the chess analogy, it is plausible that while two sets of objects/boards 
are being used, they clearly represent a single game, with a single 
outcome. The “game-object” that is (say) the Black queen is not iden-
tical to the carved piece of wood on Neil’s board, nor the Lego figure 
on Nathan’s; rather, it is something abstracted from the specific physi-
cal tokens used to represent it. Similarly, the causal interactions that 
make up the game are, properly understood, not duplicated: Nathan 
moves one queen, not two (otherwise, he has cheated), and we record 
one win, not two (else best-out-of-three would cease to make sense).
These points equally apply in the VR case: two systems are be-
ing used, but they represent a single virtual world, featuring a single 
virtual frisbee. The representational modes of playing chess without 
13 See e.g. https://www.engadget.com/2017/12/19/facebook-spaces-vive/ 
and https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/19/facebook-spaces-social-vr/
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a board make it clear that the game is not to be identified with any 
given board, and the cross-play VR cases make it clear that the VR 
game (or the objects therein) are not to be identified with the pro-
cessing bases. To do so is akin to mistakenly equate a prop—e.g. the 
carved piece of wood/Lego mini-fig—with the “game-object”—the 
Black queen—that they represent.
3 Against weak virtual digitalism
The alternative version of digitalism takes virtual objects to be dis-
tinct from, through dependent upon, digital objects. This weak vir-
tual digitalism (WVD, for short), retains the key aspect of virtual 
digitalism—virtual objects/events really exist—but avoids collaps-
ing the distinction between the virtual and the digital.
In this section, we critique WVD. Specifically, we target the fact 
that WVD requires that virtual entities stand in genuine causal rela-
tions. For Chalmers, this is a consequence of his ‘philosophical struc-
turalism’, whereby virtual and non-virtual reality are ultimately 
different implementations of closely related causal structures (2017: 
349). Even non-structuralist versions of WVD, should they emerge, 
will incur a similar commitment, on pain of rendering the virtual 
merely epiphenomenal, and so violating Alexander’s Dictum, i.e. to 
be is to have causal powers.
In §3.1, we give reasons for thinking that virtual entities do not 
stand in such relations, and hence for the falsity of WVD. However, 
even if WVDists were able to demonstrate that the virtual involves 
genuine causal relations, this leads to a second objection, discussed 
in §3.2: a form of the exclusion problem. The upshot is that no mat-
ter whether virtual entities do or do not stand in genuine causal rela-
tions, WVD should be rejected.
3.1 Causes and pseudo-causes
Salmon (1998: 194), citing Reichenbach (1958), points out that there 
are some processes which seem causal, but in fact are not. His classic 
example is that of the spotlight moving along the wall. Each point 
where the light lands on the wall is followed by an adjacent point 
where the light lands next, giving the impression of a genuine causal 
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process relating the two. However, with a distant-enough wall, the 
spotlight could ‘travel’ across the wall at a speed faster than light. As 
this is physically impossible, it becomes apparent that the spotlight’s 
‘journey’ is a pseudo process: it has the appearance of an ordinary 
causal process14 but not the requisite character of one.
A more salient example of pseudo causal processes is traditional 
animation. Jerry strikes Tom on the head, and a lump emerges on 
Tom’s head. We naturally describe this as a case where the strike 
caused the lump. Of course, there is no genuine causal relation be-
tween the frames of the animation. There is a relevant causal relation 
nearby, however, involving the animator. She draws this sequence 
because it fits the story she is trying to tell, and that story rough-
ly mirrors how things happen in the world: hits on heads result in 
lumps on heads. The genuine causal relation lies not between the 
frames of the animation, but rather between the thoughts that lie in 
the head of the animator.
With these examples in mind, we can ask: are the causal inter-
actions between virtual entities genuine causal processes as WVD 
requires, or pseudo processes like those of the spotlight and of tra-
ditional animation?
The first point to make is that VR is unlike traditional animation 
in at least one crucial respect: in traditional animation, each frame’s 
relation to the next is set by the intentions of the animator, which 
may or may not respect ordinary causal interactions in the world. 
In modern-day VR, on the other hand, typically a game engine con-
trols the production of frames, doing so on the basis of an underly-
ing physics engine that encodes (roughly) real-world physics. Thus, 
whilst the animator may decide on a whim that the ball will bounce 
this way or that, regardless of the physics, the game engine sticks to 
a set of pre-ordained rules about how things interact.
This should not make us think that there is a genuine causal re-
lation between the occurrences in VR, however. The game engine 
is doing nothing more than the animator in this case. The VR ex-
perience may be being produced from a digital process rather than 
an organic one, but the genuine causal interactions are between the 
14 The internet is replete with examples of cats chasing laser points in a way 
that suggests they are readily taken in.
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execution of bits of code that decide which frames to render, not 
between the rendered frames themselves. VR and traditional anima-
tion are on a par in this respect.
More importantly, one characteristic feature of VR is interactiv-
ity—users can fire a gun, kill a zombie, and thereby feel relieved 
through VR. This kind of causal interaction is not possible with tra-
ditional animation which is drawn in advance, and represented in a 
pre-determined way. The causal chain between the user, a virtual 
gun, a virtual zombie, and the user again would seem to entail that 
the virtual causal steps were indeed genuine.
But while it is certainly clear that a genuine causal interaction 
can be traced from the user, via the controller, to the computer, and 
back to the user via the headset, nowhere in that chain does a gun or 
a zombie appear. This is despite the fact that talk of guns and zombies 
is clearly an entirely sensible way to describe, report, and discuss 
the VR experience that took place. Yet this is just loose talk. For 
compare the obvious way of describing what happened in traditional 
animation: Jerry smacked Tom on the head and caused a lump to 
appear. Or how we talk of the spotlight ‘traveling’ across the wall. 
These are intuitively appealing ways of apparently characterising a 
causal process that nevertheless reifies a pseudo process instead. And 
we need independent reason to think that the causal interactions in 
VR are genuine, rather than simply pseudo. None seem forthcoming.
3.2 Is virtual causation genuine enough?
We accept that one genuine causal process can be traced from the 
user, via controller, PC, and headset, back to the user again. Of 
course, that does not mean that there is not also a second, corre-
sponding, equally genuine, causal process simultaneously holding be-
tween the user, a gun, a zombie, and back to the user again. Propos-
ing a second such causal chain—one that supervenes upon, but does 
not wholly reduce to, the digital base—allows the WVDist to retain 
both dependence (without reduction!) of the virtual upon the digital, 
and genuine causal relations between virtual objects and events.
In the philosophy of mind, non-reductive physicalism (NRP) 
is the view that the mental supervenes on, but does not reduce 
to, the physical. It has been argued—by Jaegwon Kim (1993) in 
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particular—that NRP is incompatible with three other attractive 
theses: first, that the physical domain is causally closed, second, that 
the mental has causal efficacy, and third, that there is no systematic 
causal redundancy. Kim’s ‘causal exclusion argument’ says (roughly) 
that if we assume the mental has causal efficacy, and if we assume (as 
physicalists must) that the physical domain is causally closed, then 
either the mental is identical with something physical, or there is 
systematic causal redundancy. Adding the further assumption that 
there is no such redundancy, we are left with the conclusion that the 
mental is identical with something physical, pace NRP.
There is an obvious parallel between WVD and NRP: they both 
claim that one domain depends upon, but does not reduce to, an-
other, but that the dependent domain has causal efficacy. This sug-
gests that there will be a causal exclusion problem for WVD, akin 
to that faced by NRP: the digital (non-virtual) process does all the 
causal work, leaving none for the virtual processes to do. More pre-
cisely, we give a causal exclusion argument against WVD (modelled 
on Zhong’s 2014 version of the traditional exclusion argument):
(E1) Virtual properties supervene on non-virtual properties. 
[Central tenet of WVD]
(E2) Virtual properties are not identical with non-virtual proper-
ties. [Central tenet of WVD]
(E3) If an instance of a non-virtual property has a cause that oc-
curs at t, it has a (sufficient) non-virtual cause that occurs at t.
(E4) It is not the case that virtual and non-virtual properties caus-
ally overdetermine the effects (in a systematic way).
(E5) Therefore, virtual properties are causally inefficacious. 
[Contradiction of WVD]
In this argument (E1) and (E2) are part of the definition of WVD, 
and the conclusion flatly contradicts the causal commitments of 
WVD. The argument appears to be valid15 and so the cogency of 
15 The validity will depend, at least in part, on deep issues to do with the meta-
physics of causation, and the notion of a sufficient cause. We side-step those here.
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WVD depends on the plausibility of (E3) and (E4).
Premise (E3) is a port of the causal closure principle from the 
NRP debate. In the NRP version, the idea is that every physical event 
has a sufficient physical cause.16 More loosely, the (fundamental) 
physical domain does all the necessary causal work. Once ported 
into the argument for WVD, the closure principle becomes about 
the virtual and non-virtual instead. In this form the closure premise 
claims that there is suitably complete causal history of our actions 
when using VR that relates only non-virtual things (the CPU, GPU, 
headset screen, retina, optic nerve, etc.). One need not deny that 
there is a good way to describe what happened that doesn’t mention 
the processors, screen etc. (e.g. ‘shot a gun and killed a zombie’) to 
think that this principle is plausible. This seems exactly analogous 
to the sense in which we may talk of ordinary macro-causal connec-
tions between, say, billiard balls, and yet still accept that the entire 
process could be re-described in terms of fundamental micro-phys-
ical interactions. If we accept that the microphysical story suffices 
in such cases, then it seems plausible to accept that the non-virtual 
story (macro or micro) suffices in the VR cases too.
A classic line of argument in favour of (E4) runs as follows: when 
a firing squad executes a prisoner, the death of the prisoner is over-
determined in the sense that there were several distinct, and equally 
sufficient, causes of that death present (assuming each member of 
the squad was deadly accurate). This is a literal co-incidence, and 
an entirely plausible scenario to boot. However, systematic overde-
termination of the sort that would need to obtain for the NRPist, 
or the WVDist, is not of this form: it does not posit some isolated 
co-incidences here and there, but ubiquitous and systematic co-inci-
dence in every instance of mental/virtual causation. Such systematic 
overdetermination is widely claimed to be implausible (Kim 1993, 
Merricks 2001, Papineau 2002, Schiffer 1987, Zhong 2014).
If we accept both (E3) and (E4), then we get the result that the 
non-virtual alone does sufficient causal work, and that there is not 
any systematic causal over-sufficiency in the world. Thus, there is no 
causal work for the virtual left to do.
16 This is a comparatively weak formulation of the causal closure principle.
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3.3 Responses from the weak virtual digitalist
The parallels between WVD and NRP prompted our formation of 
the above exclusion argument, but that parallel also opens up a range 
of extant responses that the WVDist might adopt in response.
Non-physicalists can, and do, deny the causal closure principle in 
the original NRP exclusion argument. One might think: perhaps the 
WVDist can similarly deny (3). Whilst denying closure is obviously 
a reasonable position for the non-physicalst to take, it is far from ob-
vious that a physicalist—who the Kimian exclusion argument is di-
rected at—can do the same and still be a physicalist in the ordinary 
sense. The digitalist faces the same problem: what makes them a 
digitalist is the commitment to the idea that underpinning each vir-
tual object or event is some digital process that realises it. Accepting 
that some virtual event did causal work, but that no non-virtual, 
digital, event did—as denying the closure premise requires—drives 
a wedge between the virtual and the digital that no genuine virtual 
digitalist could accept.
Another standard approach to the original causal exclusion ar-
gument is to query the application of overdetmination premise. For 
example, any given biological process (digestion, say) has a parallel 
chemical process that underpins it. And any given chemical process 
is further underpinned by fundamental physical process. There are 
therefore three causal processes we can tell describe when one suffers 
acid reflux: one biological, one chemical, one physical. If these three 
descriptions are rivals, then the overdetermination principle presses 
us to choose between them on pain of positing an overabundance of 
causal structure in the world. As such the exclusion argument proves 
to much: it eliminates biological causes and chemical causes from the 
world! This reductio demonstrates that something has gone wrong in 
the exclusion argument. Notice, however, that if the three processes 
are not rivals after all, then the overdetermination principle is silent 
on them. Conceived as re-descriptions of the same phenomena (fun-
damentally physical or not), the biological, chemical, and physical ca-
sual stories are no longer in tension. The overdetermination principle 
might be true, but it simply does not apply in this case.17
17 We remain judiciously silent on whether this case is sufficiently analogous 
Bereitgestellt von  University of Glasgow Library | Heruntergeladen  19.09.19 15:49   UTC
17Virtual Reality: Digital or Fictonal?
Such a response would appear to save chemistry and biology from 
exclusion, so can the same approach be used by the WVDist? First, 
the saviour of chemistry and biology in this example appealed to the 
fact that they were simply describing the same phenomena, in a dif-
ferent way. That is highly suggestive of a reductive position that the 
WVDist simply cannot adopt in the virtual-digital case, lest they 
collapse their position into strong virtual digitalism. Second, defend-
ers of chemistry and biology do not claim that with each new level of 
causal process comes a genuinely novel reality. The WVDist, on the 
other hand, requires that the advent of the right digital processes and 
human interaction, gave rise to a genuinely novel reality. This is a key 
dis-analogy between the two cases.
4 Ironing out a potential wrinkle
The foregoing lays out the argument against two distinct versions of 
virtual digitalism. However, there is a third way.18 As we understand 
them, both strong and weak virtual digitalism concern the relation-
ship between virtual and digital objects; the former identifies the 
two, the latter takes the virtual to depend upon the digital. But nei-
ther specifies the relationship between digital objects and data struc-
tures. Instead, we earlier adopted, as a simplifying assumption, the 
idea that digital objects just are data structures. The trouble is that it 
is possible to weaken this relation, taking digital objects to distinct 
from, but dependent upon, data structures. In other words, along 
with adopting either a strong or weak account of the relationship be-
tween virtual and digital objects, one can also adopt a strong or weak 
account of the relationship between digital objects and data struc-
tures. And what option we take concerning the latter relationship 
seems to have some interesting knock-on consequences. Specifically, 
given a weak position regarding the relationship between digital ob-
jects and data structures, the cross-play problem appears to evapo-
rate: assuming that the relation between virtual objects and digital 
objects is that of identity, but that the relation between the digital 
objects and their associated data structures is something weaker (e.g., 
to the original mental-physical case to be persuasive.
18 Thanks to David Chalmers for pushing us on this line.
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dependence), then we can say that there is just one (virtual) frisbee, 
identical to one (digital) object, and this digital object is itself depen-
dent upon distinct data structures.
That said, this doesn’t help the digital realist. For adding this ex-
tra layer gives rise to a dialectic parallel to that outlined above. In-
stead of asking, “are virtual objects real?”, we now ask, “are digital 
objects real?”. Everyone should grant the reality of the data struc-
tures on the processors,19 but the reality of digital objects is very 
much up still up for debate.
If the data structures are identical with the digital objects—a view 
we can dub strong digital realism—then the answer to that question 
would be ‘yes’, and, depending upon which option one takes regard-
ing strong or weak virtual digitalism, our above objections kick in.
However, if data structures and digital objects are distinct, then 
the question is not yet settled: an argument needs to be given for weak 
digital realism. And, more importantly, the causal arguments against 
WVD apply, mutatis mutandis: the weak digital realist has no obvious 
way to show they are employing a genuine, rather than pseudo-, no-
tion of causation at the level of digital objects, and the view faces a 
version of the exclusion problem.
So, to come back to the position detailed three paragraphs ago, 
identifying virtual objects with digital objects while having digital 
objects merely depend upon data structures avoids the cross-play 
problem frying pan, but does so by jumping directly into the (one 
level down) fire of exclusion problems and pseudo-causation.
Setting this aside, however, note that, absent an argument for 
weak digital realism, the reality of virtual objects is not settled by 
identifying them with digital objects. For while this third way may 
offer an escape from the cross-play problem, it does so at the cost of 
rendering Chalmers’ case for the reality of virtual objects incom-
plete at best.
19 The idea of rejecting the existence of data structures due to philosophical 
reasons is laughable. To paraphrase Lewis, (1991: 58–9), how would you like the 
job of telling the programmers that they must change their ways, and abjure count-
less errors, now that philosophy has discovered that there are no data structures?
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5 Virtual walt-fictionalism
We have argued that virtual digitalism can come in (at least) two 
forms, strong and weak. The strong version is, we have argued, too 
strong: there are compelling cases wherein a single virtual entity is 
supposedly identical to two distinct digital entities. Meanwhile, the 
weak option is too weak: virtual causation is either a pseudo-process, 
unfit to sustain the causal commitments of the picture proposed, or 
is excluded in favour of its digital base. The upshot is that virtual 
digitalism as a whole looks unpromising. And, as virtual digitalism is 
the best form of virtual realism available, the same goes for it as well. 
We need to consider the alternatives.
In this section, we do exactly that, sketching virtual walt-fictionalism, 
a form of irrealism. We begin (§4.1) by spelling out the background 
theory, Walton’s conception of fictionality. Having fixed this founda-
tion, we then (§4.2) proceed to explicate our account of virtual real-
ity. Finally (§4.3), we consider the benefits of adopting this picture.
5.1 Background: Walton on fiction and fictionality
Walton offers an account of representational (art)works founded 
upon a theory of make-believe.
According to Walton, when we engage with representational art-
works, we play sophisticated games of make-believe. These games 
are not different in kind from those games played during childhood 
(cops and robbers, bears, etc.); all that is different is (perhaps) level 
of sophistication and particular imaginative activities.
More specifically, according to Walton, when we engage with a 
fiction like Harry Potter, we imagine (i.e., make-believe) that there 
are witches and wizards, that Hermione is one, that she goes to a 
school named ‘Hogwarts’, etc. But the contents of these imaginings 
are not chaotic; rather, they are ‘constrained … some are proper, ap-
propriate in certain contexts, and others not.’ (Walton 1990: 9). In 
particular, our imaginings are constrained by the objective features 
of the work in question (and perhaps wider features of the context 
of creation and critical appreciation). This is not to say that one can-
not engage with Harry Potter and imagine e.g. that Voldemort was in 
fact a selfless hero, Harry a terrible villain, and the story suggests 
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otherwise because history is written by the victors. Rather, it is to 
say that not all Harry Potter-based games of make-believe are created 
equal. Neil, who images that Harry is a heroic figure and Voldemort 
a wicked villain, is playing a game that is authorized for Harry Potter, 
whereas Nathan, who imagines that Voldemort was the real victim, 
is playing a game that is unauthorized. More specifically, in conduct-
ing his game, Nathan is ignoring or mis-interpreting certain objec-
tive features of the work, leading to his deviant, unauthorized (but 
still perfectly possible to play!) game of make-believe.
To give the proper Waltonian gloss, representational artworks 
are props—items whose existence and real features are used to guide 
and determine features of the imagined world of the game of make-
believe. Many things are designed props—for example, dolls and toy 
trucks are designed specifically to be employed as props in specific 
games of make-believe, as are (according to Walton) fictional novels 
and paintings. And nearly everything can be an ad hoc prop, ‘pressed 
into service for a single game of make-believe on a single occasion’ 
(Walton 1990: 51). So, for example, a stump can serve as a prop in a 
particular game of make-believe according to which we are to make-
believe that, wherever there is a stump, there is a bear, while a paper 
towel roll makes a serviceable spyglass, despite the fact that this is 
not what it was intended for.
Props are items whose existence and features are used to guide 
and determine the contents of a particular game of make-believe.20 
And what tells us how to ‘translate’ the relevant features of props 
into the appropriate imaginative contents are principles of generation—
roughly, “rules” that prescribe what it is we are to imagine (make-
believe). These principles can take various forms. For example, they 
can be conditional, saying that if a certain actual feature is noted, then 
we should imagine something—for example, ‘if there is a mug on the 
table, then imagine there is a goblin on the table’. Alternatively, some 
are straightforwardly stipulative; e.g., ‘Imagine that there is a goblin 
on the table’. Finally, some are supplemental, bolstering or clarifying 
20 Note that props can ‘stand-in’ for themselves—a particular person might 
serve as a “prop” for themselves (e.g., Nathan might be a prop for Nathan him-
self). Additionally, props are not restricted to objects—for example, Nathan’s 
running away from a tree stump can serve as a prop, indicating that, within the 
relevant game of make-believe, Nathan is running away from a bear.
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other principles—e.g., ‘if we are prescribed to imagine a goblin on 
the table, then imagine that it is wearing a red hat’.
In this way, according to Walton, our engagement with fictions is 
both imaginative, in the sense that being so engaged involves imagin-
ing (make-believing) that certain things are the case, and structured, 
in the sense that there are oftentimes rules that determine what is/
is not to be imagined (e.g. we might be prescribed to imagine that x 
is dead if, in reality, x is lying motionless on the ground, or that x is 
a bear if, in reality, x is a tree stump).
Taking all of this together, Walton says that a fiction is a repre-
sentational work that has as one of its functions the role of serving as 
a prop in a specific game of make-believe (1990: 51). One upshot of 
this definition is that ‘fiction’ will apply to many things we naturally 
tend to not call fictions—dolls, dances, and disco songs, as well as 
novels, paintings, and plays. As Walton is explicit that he is not inter-
ested in capturing the everyday usage of ‘fiction’ (1990: 70), this is 
a feature, rather than a bug. That said, to avoid potential confusion, 
following Friend (2008: 154), we use the term ‘walt-fiction’ to pick 
out this category of works.
Relatedly, a proposition p is fictional in work w iff w has the 
function of being a prop in a game of make-believe with principles of 
generation that entail, given the features of w, that full appreciation 
of w requires imagining that p. Or, slightly simpler, ‘a proposition is 
fictional just in case there is a prescription to the fact that it is to be 
imagined’ (Walton 2013: 9).21
5.2 Stating the view
The central claim of virtual walt-fictionalism (VWF) is that virtual 
reality is a kind of walt-fiction, and our engagement with VR is not dif-
ferent in kind from our engagement with other forms of walt-fiction.
In particular, proper engagement with VR is a kind of make-be-
lieve, featuring VR specific props and principles of generation. These 
VR specific props include digital elements like the particular images, 
sounds, and haptic feedback mechanisms employed by VR systems. 
21 For further discussion of Waltons’ account of fictionality, see e.g. Wood-
ward 2014 and Wildman and Woodward 2018.
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Such elements really exist—we see, hear, and feel them whenever 
we engage with VR applications, there are a multitude of individuals 
within the VR industry who create and produce them, and legions 
of individuals who criticize them. Further, the features of these ele-
ments serve to characterize the various games of make-believe that 
we play when we engage with a particular VR application, via the 
appropriate VR-specific principles of generation.
For example, take Sansar, Linden Lab’s VR-version of Second Life. 
Some Sansar-specific principles of generation are
(i) Imagine that this projected image of a large, green, ogre-
looking thing is a fully 3-dimensional entity; 
(ii) If the text of an English sentence proceeded by ‘[Gørbl@rg]:’ 
appears in the window in the bottom right, then imagine that 
this ogre-thing uttered the relevant sentence out-loud. 
(iii) If we are proscribed to imagine that this thing uttered some-
thing, then imagine that Nathan (whose avatar the ogre-thing 
is) said it.
Assuming VWF, it is clear that the props—i.e., the code, images, 
sounds, etc. that are used in order to engage in the relevant game 
of make-believe—are real (otherwise, it would be impossible to be 
able to play the associated game). However, these props are not iden-
tical to the virtual objects. That’s because, for the VWFist, virtual 
objects are those objects that we make-believe to exist whenever we 
engage with a particular VR walt-fiction in an authorized manner.22 
Similarly, the reality of said props does not entail the reality of dis-
tinct virtual objects that depend upon the former for their existence. 
Instead, these virtual objects “exist”, in as much as they do, only 
when we play the relevant games of make-believe. Consequently, 
they lack the robust reality that props possess.
For example, returning to Longbow, the VWFist will happily 
grant that images of little grey men wearing Viking helmets, castle 
22 Potential exception: there are some objects that appear within a virtual 
environment which represent themselves. In these cases, it is possible that the 
prop is identical to the “virtual object”. However, these don’t offer much hope 
for would-be realists.
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gates, balloons, arrows, and a bow are real, and that these images 
serve as props in a game of make-believe. But the little grey men 
wearing Viking helmets aren’t real. Rather, they only “exist” within 
the Longbow game of make-believe. Once we stop playing the game, 
they stop “existing”.23
Further, consider the various events involved in playing Longbow: 
pulling back the bowstring, firing an arrow, etc. These events, ac-
cording to VWF, do not really occur. Instead, they fictionally occur—
that is, we make-believe that they occur as part of the elaborate game 
of make-believe we engage in whenever we play Longbow. Of course, 
many of these events will roughly correspond to real-world actions 
that do really occur—for example, whenever Neil fictionally draws 
the bowstring (which doesn’t really happen), he moves the control 
sticks in such-and-such a manner (which really does happen). For 
those who are conversant with the relevant game of make-believe, 
we can readily call the really occurring event ‘their drawing the 
bow’, but this is to use a fictional gloss to describe a distinct, non-
bow-involving, really occurring event.
5.3 The advantages of going Waltonian
Virtual walt-fictionalism has a lot going for it. Perhaps the best point 
in its favour is that it is a natural extension of a powerful and intuitive 
general account of representational works.
Another favourable point is that VWF avoids the problems fac-
ing virtual digitalism. In particular, the causal powers argument 
stemmed from the idea that, within virtual environments, virtual 
objects appear to have specific causal powers; this was then used to 
motivate the idea that virtual objects are identical to digital objects, 
which are the seat of these powers. According to VWF, virtual ob-
jects fictionally have such causal powers—that is, within the relevant 
games of make-believe, these objects are taken to (exist and) possess 
the relevant powers. And this will be explained by some relevant 
principle of generation linking the content of our make-believing 
to some real feature of a relevant prop (or, depending on the kind 
23 Indeed, one might go further and simply deny that the little men exist at all. 
However, we are here happy to adopt the slightly weaker position.
Bereitgestellt von  University of Glasgow Library | Heruntergeladen  19.09.19 15:49   UTC
Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman24
of principle, possibly simply stipulating it). Thus it is fictionally the 
case that Pikachu has the power to thundershock Squirtle because 
the various props that underpin our Pikachu-imaginings have certain 
powers that affect the props that underpin Squirtle-imaginings.
Similarly for the argument from perception. Chalmers’ idea was 
that, when we are engaged with VR, we perceive virtual objects; 
this, in combination with the general perceptual rule that what we 
perceive is the causal basis of our perception, was meant to push 
us into identifying virtual objects with digital objects. According to 
VWF, this argument conflates fictional perceptions—i.e., what is per-
ceived within a game of make-believe—with actual perceptions. If 
we consider what we are in fact perceiving—the images, sounds, and 
haptic feedback we are receiving—then the general perceptual prin-
ciple will push us to say that we are perceiving the relevant props. 
Given our engagement with the relevant fiction, we can readily de-
scribe this in terms of what we, within the relevant game of make-
believe, are fictionally perceiving: that Jerry has hit Tom, resulting 
in a bump. In so doing, we focus not on what is in reality causing 
what we are seeing, hearing, etc., but rather on what is causing it in 
the world of the fiction. And, within the fiction, it is appropriate to say 
that it is the relevant virtual objects that we are perceiving. But this 
certainly does not entail that we are in fact perceiving the relevant 
virtual objects!
Relatedly, VWF is perfectly compatible with the possibility of 
cross-play. Principles of generation can map multiple, distinct props 
to the same “game-object”—this sort of thing is common-place in 
play-by-mail chess, role-playing-games, and serial fictions (for exam-
ple, if we consider the whole Star Wars cannon, how many props are 
there for Obi-Wan Kenobi?). Adopting VWF makes VR cross-play 
simply another instance of a familiar occurrence.
VWF also avoids the various problems we raised against WVD. 
By denying that virtual events really occur (instead, they fictionally 
occur), the VWFist avoids postulating any sort of genuine causal re-
lation between the virtual objects/events. Consequently, they need 
not worry about distinguishing genuine from pseudo-causation, nor 
about overdetermination.
Finally, it is worth discussing what VWF has to say about the phe-
nomenology of virtuality. Naïve VR users, on this view, are engaged in 
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an imaginative activity—they are playing a (rich, prop-driven) game 
of make-believe. Of course, because they are new to this game (and 
because the props are pretty exciting), they might mistakenly think 
that what they are perceiving is occurring in physical space. (In that 
sense, they are not unlike children who first encounter a puppet, 
and think that it is alive.) Meanwhile, experienced VR users are also 
engaged in the imaginative activity of playing a game of make-be-
lieve, and will have moved passed this sort of mis-conception. Fur-
ther, because they are so well versed in these games, they will treat 
the ‘virtual objects’ they encounter in ways that wouldn’t occur to 
the naïve users—they will learn to exploit ‘distinctive affordances’ 
(Chalmers 2017: 331) that the principles of generation license. And 
as such users become so intimately familiar with playing these games 
of make-believe (especially when these games are persistent and 
highly immersive), such users might (mistakenly!) start to think that 
the game worlds are a distinct kind of reality. Indeed, the way that 
we talk about fiction tends to encourage this mis-conception. But a 
mis-conception it is.
6 Conclusion
We began with an ontological question: are the objects and events 
that appear to make up the environments of virtual reality *real*? 
The virtual realist says they are, the irrealist that they are not. In 
an attempt to adjudicate this debate, we focused on the most de-
veloped form of virtual realism: Chalmers’ virtual digitalism. After 
disentangling some details of the position, we argued that both weak 
and strong varieties of virtual digitalism face significant problems—
problems that push us towards the irrealist camp. 
Building on this, we then proceeded to sketch virtual walt-fic-
tonalism, a form of virtual irrealism based upon Walton’s theory of 
fictionality. This position, we contend, provides a highly plausible 
account of the virtual, one which avoids the hazards that befell the 
digitalist.
Of course, these benefits might not be enough to sway the would-
be virtual digitalist/realist to come over to the irrealist camp. No 
doubt there will be objections to virtual walt-fictionalism that must 
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be addressed.24 but given the apparent advantages over the digitalist 
that we have laid out here, we think that virtual walt-fictionalism 
deserves to be taken seriously.
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